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                                                                                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 08-1337
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
      v.
PERCY WILLIAM TRAVILLION,
                                                         Appellant.
                                          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 04-cr-00144-7)
District Judge:  Hon. Joy Flowers Conti
                                            
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on February 3, 2009
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 7, 2009)
                       
O P I N I O N
                      
2ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Percy Travillion appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we discuss them only briefly here. 
On June 16, 2004, a grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging eight
individuals, including Travillion, with various drug-trafficking offenses.  Travillion was
charged in three of the nineteen counts.  Specifically, Count Nine charged Travillion with
conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine.  Count Ten charged him
with possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, and Count
Thirteen charged him with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of powder cocaine. 
After a seven-day trial, a jury convicted Travillion of all three Counts.  The District Court
then sentenced him to 188 months of incarceration on each of the three counts, to be
served concurrently, and five years of supervised release.  Travillion appeals three issues;
we have jurisdiction over his appeal under 8 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Travillion first argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the
jury’s convictions for all three counts.  Our review of an insufficiency of the evidence
challenge is plenary.  United States v. Taftsiou, 144 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1998).  We
must affirm the convictions if, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, a rational trier of fact could have found Travillion guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995).
      Corpus delicti means “the body or substance of the crime charged.”  Government of1
Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1991).  
3
Travillion’s insufficiency argument attacks the government’s evidence that he
conspired with Michael Good, a drug trafficker in Pittsburgh; instead, according to
Travillion, the government merely proved a buyer-seller agreement with Good. 
Travillion’s argument fails because the record is replete with sufficient evidence
supporting the jury’s determination that he had an agreement, with the common purpose
of distributing drugs, with Michael Good.  Indeed, Good himself testified for the
government to this effect against Travillion.
Travillion next argues that the District Court erred in two ways when instructing
the jury.  First, he claims that the District Court erred by refusing his request to provide a
corpus delicti instruction for Count Ten.  Second, Travillion claims that the District Court
erred by instructing the jury that it must take any stipulated facts as true.  We review the
District Court’s refusal to give the requested instruction for abuse of discretion.  United
States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review unpreserved errors
regarding jury instructions for plain error.  United States v. Cornish, 103 F.3d 302, 306
(3d Cir. 1997).  Travillion preserved only his first claim.    
The purpose of the corpus delicti  doctrine is to prevent convictions of criminal1
defendants based solely upon untrue confessions.  See Warszower v. United States, 312
U.S. 342, 346–47 (1941).  Travillion insists that a corpus delicti instruction was necessary
4because the only evidence to support Count Ten was a tape-recorded statement with
Good, and he was thus subjected to a conviction based on “his own uncorroborated
confession.”  But we have held that tape-recorded statements “made prior to or during the
commission of a crime”—like here—“need not be corroborated.”  United States v.
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 576 (3d Cir. 1991).  The District Court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in refusing Travillion’s corpus delicti instruction. 
Travillion’s second jury-instruction claim fails, too.  To establish plain error, a
defendant must satisfy four elements:  (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e.,
clear, (3) the error must have affected substantial rights, and (4) that this Court should
correct the error because it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.  See United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 920 (3d Cir. 1996)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).  Travillion fails at least prongs three and four
because he does not contest the factual accuracy of the stipulations, and he entered into
them voluntarily.  See Cornish, 103 F.3d at 306.        
Travillion finally argues that the District Court committed two procedural errors in
sentencing, and that it erred by requiring him to supply a DNA sample.  Where, as here, a
challenge is made to the calculation of the Guidelines range, we review the District
Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.  United States v. Wood, 526 
F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2008).  
5First, he claims that the District Court erred by assigning him one criminal-history
point for a state offense where “no further penalty” was the decision.  According to
Travillion, that decision was not a “sentence,” and the District Court therefore should not
have added the point.  Travillion’s claim fails because that state offense consisted of two
counts, for which the state court imposed concurrent sentences of probation after he plead
nolo contendere to both.  That state court determination was thus a sentence under the
Guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(a)(1).  The District Court properly increased his
Guideline Range. 
Travillion’s second jury-sentencing claim fails, too.  He asserts that the District
Court erred in assigning him two points for obstruction of justice because the record does
not support a finding that he willfully lied during his trial testimony.  An enhancement for
obstruction of justice requires findings that the defendant gave false testimony concerning
a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.  United States v.
Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).  Here, the Jury concluded that Travillion did lie about the type of drug at issue
for Count Ten:  Travillion testified that heroin was the drug, but the jury necessarily
rejected this because it found him guilty for possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine.  An enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate where the jury
necessarily rejects a defendant’s testimony to find him guilty.  Id.            
6He finally claims that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in
enacting the  DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, which the District Court relied on
to mandate that he supply a DNA sample.  We agree with the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals that Congress acted within its power in enacting this Act
because the personal, identifying information contained in a DNA sample constitutes a
“thing” in interstate commerce.  See United States v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2007).       
We will thus affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
